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State Antitrust Enforcement and
Coordination With Federal
Enforcement
By STANLEY MOSK*
In the field of antitrust enforcement, perhaps the most sig-
nificant development of the past four years has been the rekindling
of public interest in state antitrust laws. A dozen or more states
have accelerated the pace of their enforcement activities. Last year
the newly emerging State of Hawaii and the State of Washington
enacted their first antitrust statutes. Meanwhile, the already
established activities of the federal Anti-Trust Division have con-
tinued unabated. My topic of state-federal coordination of anti-
trust enforcement is, therefore, a timely one.
In speaking on this subject I am naturally influenced by the
background of our own experience here in California.
Judged from the viewpoui: ' 1-- firtecn original colonies,
California is still a young state, albeit a -s0" one. Iappily, we have
not been too proud to borrow from the experience of our older
sisters. And so, just as the common law concept of antitrust was
transplanted into our colonial law at an early date, so in California
did our court give common law relief to a business man harassed
by a restraint of trade as far back as 1888.'
In many ways, the experience of California in antitrust enforce-
ment is typical. As early as 1907 our legislature enacted the
comprehensive statute known to us as the Cartwright Act.2 For
half a century its public enforcement was nearly non-existent. So
much so, that it was christened by an editorial writer as "Cali-
* Attorney General of California. Mr. Mosk presented this paper to the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Laws, August 7, 1962.
1 Santa Clara Valley Co. v. Ilaycs, 76 Cal. 887, 18 Pac. 391 (1888).
2 Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §§16600-17818.
STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND COORDINATION
fornia's Sleeping Bcauty ',3 Indeed, one California attorney who
was asked about a proposed price-fixing scheme wrote to the presi-
dent of the company, saying: "As general counsel for the company,
I conclude that the proposed plan is illegal. In my role as a mem-
ber of the Board of Directors, however, I feel there is very little
chance it will be discovered."
Prior to 1959, only four public cases were brought under the
Cartwright Act.4 In part, this was due to the fact that it was not
until 1946 that our Supreme Court held unconstitutional one
section of the act that had crippled its enforceability 5 Also re-
sponsible, however, was the absence of funds for the employment
of necessary staff to prosecute violations.
In 1959, during the first year of Governor Brown's administra-
tion and my own incumbency as Attorney General, the first specific
appropriation to finance enforcement of the act was obtained from
the legislature.
During the past three years we have initiated ten civil actions
and one criminal proceeding under the Cartwnght Act. For the
most part, they involved the suppression of competition in sup-
plying public agencies of state and local governments with the
commodities and services which they require.
Those of you who come from other parts of the country may
ponder the size and shape of California. Transplanted, it would
cover an area from Norwalk, Connecticut to Jacksonville, Florida,
and as far west as the Allegheny Mountains. Stretched another
way, it would reach from Spnngfield, Massachusetts to India-
napolis, covering the area between the Great Lakes and the Ohio
River. The natural barriers of the mountains to our East and the
ocean to our West channel within our own boundanes trade and
commerce worth billions in annual value. No two metropolitan
centers comparable to Los Angeles and San Francisco are so remote
from the boundaries of another state.
3 The Cartwnght Act-Califormas Sleeping Beauty, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 200
(1949).
4 People v. Building Maintenance Contractors Ass n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264 P.2d
31 (1953); People v. H. Jevne Co., 179 Cal. 621, 178 Pac. 517 (1919); People v.
Sacramento Butchers' Prot. Ass n, 12 Cal. App. 471 (1910); Union Ice Co. v.
Rose, 11 Cal. App. 357, 104 Pac. 277 (1909).
5 Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §16723 (repealed by Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 796) was
held unconstitutional first in, Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d
34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946), and then in People v. Building Maintenance Con-
tractors' Ass n, supra note 4,
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These geographic considerations required that California pro-
tect its business enterpnse from illegal restraints. An enormous
volume of commerce confined within the state is still beyond reach
of the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the extension of its junsdic-
hon in recent years.
The converse, however, is not true. That is to say, a transaction
in California that falls within reach of the Sherman Act is equally
subject to the junsdictional scope of the Cartwright Act. For
example, an agreement upon the price at which goods shipped into
California are to be sold after arval would violate both state and
federal laws.
And so there exists a broad area of concurrent antitrust juns-
diction. Coordination of state and federal activity in areas of
concurrent junsdiction is nothing new in the annals of law enforce-
ment. We found it necessary dunng the prohibition era. It re-
mains with us today in the important field of controlling the traffic
in narcotics.
Where concurrent state and federal laws are harmoniously
directed to a common end, having in mind their complementary
function, the coordination of their administration is essentially a
practical problem. It involves a series of specific situations as they
anse from time to time, each of which deserves individual atten-
bon. Considerations germane to their resolution are largely prag-
matic. The efficient use of available manpower, the effectiveness
of investigative procedures, the type of relief to be sought, the
minimizing of travel and other expenses in the light of the location
of prospective defendants and probable venue-such mundane
factors as these are prominent in the minds of those who must
coordinate at the staff level. They are inherent in the meaning of
the word "coordinate" as applied to the federal-state relationship.
Coordination also requires that thought be given to the possi-
bility of jurisdictional conflict. Conceivably, this could be of two
distinct types, and the distinction between them is important.
On the one hand, there could be administrative conflict be-
tween state and federal officials, each vying with the other to
usurp the limelight and to make a record at the expense of the
other. Whatever may be the experience in other fields of govern-
ment, such conflict does not exist in the field of antitrust. In my
opinion, the extent of the existing and foreseeable workloads that
[Vol. 51,
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confront both state and federal agencies effectively preclude any
duplication of effort or severe inter-agency rivalry within the area
of concurrent jurisdiction.
Here in California, we have repeatedly sought federal take-over
of cases having interstate ramifications simply in order to let our
staff concentrate on matters within our own bailiwick. Conversely,
a representative of the Department of Justice has expressed the
view that the states may be better equipped to deal with those
restraints which, although within the federal jurisdiction, are
primarily of local impact. It is also said that: "The Department
of Justice necessarily must give priority in assigning its limited man-
power to practices affecting multistate markets." Consistent with
this understandable policy, federal authorities have turned over to
us several cases involving local restraints. Already we have success-
fully prosecuted one of them to completion under the Cartwnght
Act. Others are pending. They have called to our attention at least
one matter which directly involved foreign commerce whose magni-
tude in the overall picture did not warrant the diversion of their
manpower from more important assignments.
And so, based on our expenence to date, I for one have no fear
of internecine warfare between my office and the federal Antitrust
Division. Moreover, as a member of the Antitrust Committee of
the National Association of Attorneys General, I am confident that
this view is that of all State Attorneys General who are active in
antitrust enforcement.
I turn now to the other type of possible junsdictonal conflict
that I mentioned a moment ago. This is the question of whether
the jurisdiction over antitrust offenses has been preempted by the
federal government. A lively interest in this question has recently
been awakened.7 It is timely, therefore, that we consider it in some
detail.
Parenthetically, to date I know of no responsible federal or state
official who thinks that state antitrust activity represents an
intrusion by the states into an area where they have been forbidden
to tread. Were it not for the astuteness of our legal brethren on
the other side of the counsel table, I doubt the question would even
6Stern, State Antitrust Handbook 2-3 (1960).
7 E.g., Pollock, Federal Preemption and State Antitrust Enforcement 43 Chu.
B. Rec. 145 (1961-1962).
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be raised. In the past it has usually been raised as a defense, a
challenge by a defendant that the wrong sovereignty has brought
him into a court of law to answer for his conduct.
None of the federal antitrust statutes contains pre-emptive
language. Hence, it is pertinent to inquire into the state of the
law when federal cognizance was first taken of monopolies and
restraints of trade.
The concept of antitrust did not begin with the enactment
of the Sherman Act in 1890. Indeed, it did not even onginate in
anything as recent as the common law of England. As far back as
the 5th century, the Emperor Zeno issued a remarkable edict to the
Praetonal Prefect of Constantinople that bore strong resemblance
to a modem antitrust statute.8
As we know it today, however, antitrust is the hand-maiden of
our traditional economic system-call it free enterprise, competitive
capitalism, or what you will. Its development coincided with the
birth of maritime and commercial enterpnse in England. As
commerce grew, the law evolved to control its practices in the
public interest. One early statute' denounced the interception of
goods (forestalling) on their way to market because of the resulting
ability to command a monopoly price. Another 0 denounced the
injection into the chain of distribution of an unnecessary middle-
man. It shrewdly pointed out that the more hands merchandise
passes through, the dearer its price becomes. From the common
law came the tenet that commercial acts lawful when performed
by an individual businessman could become unlawful in cases of
confederation and concerted action.::
8 We command that no one may presume to exercise a monopoly of any kind
of clothing, or of fish, or of any other thing serving for food, or for any other use
whatever its nature may be; nor may any persons combine or agree m unlawful
meetings, that different lands of merchanise may not be sold at a less pnce than
they may have agreed upon among themselves. [I]f any one shall presume
to practice a monopoly, let his property be forfeited and himself condemned to
perpetual exile. And m regard to the pnncipals of other professions, if they shall
venture m the future to fix a pnce upon their merchandise and to bind themselves
by agreements not to sell at a lower pnce, let them be condemned to pay 40
pounds of gold.
(Code IV 59.) Note, 28 Amer. L. Rev. 261 (1889).
9 See III Stephen, A History of the Cnminal Law of England 199 (1883). Cf.
Mund, Open Markets: An Essential of Free Enterpnse 44 (1948).
108 Cokes Institutes 195 (1680). According to Coke this resolution was
passed in 1602, but the law was far older. It seems first to have been made
statutory in 51 Hen. III, St. 6 (1266), as reported in Great Britain, Stat. at L.,
1 Pickenng 47, 50 (1762).
11 Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 28 (1954).
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These concepts were transplanted into the American colomcs
almost immediately upon their founding. The distance separating
them from the mother country and the uncertainties of transporta-
tion made it easy to corner the market on the limited supply of
imports brought from overseas.
Only a few years after the founding of Jamestown in 1607
difficulty was experienced with forestallers who intercepted vessels
on their way up the river. To prevent such practices, it was ordered
that the master of an incoming vessel should hold her cargo ten
days in port before selling it. Such time was needed to enable the
colonists to journey to Jamestown and have equal opportunity to
compete for their needed purchases.' 2 That was in 1626.
This colonial recognition of common law concepts was a
significant indication that the ancient antagonisms to monopoly
had not been left behind in England. Our forefathers rejected the
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few to the same
extent that they rejected centralism of political power. They
postulated that diversity of effort and diversity of power are good
for the economy And they adhered to a strong belief that
preservation of competitive conditions in the market place was
best left to local government.
Small wonder, then, that it was the states and not the federal
government that first reacted to the aftermath of the industrial
revolution that swept the country after the civil war:-the trusts,
the corporate combinations and consolidations that were formed
to eliminate or restrict competition. Such arrangements were first
invalidated by the states.' 3 One of the earliest of these actions
was brought here in California. In 1889, the Attorney General of
California obtained a forfeiture of the corporate franchise of the
American Sugar Refining Company for having joined the Sugar
Trust. By the terms of its charter, the object of this company was
to engage in the business of sugar refining and trade. It was held
that such a charter could be valid only so long as the business was
carred on independently,--that is, in competition with other
12 Jones, Histoncal Development of the Law of Business Competition (pts.
1-4), 35 Yale L.J. 905 (1926); 36 Yale L.J. 42, 207, 851 (1926-1927).
isTw legal theories were prevalent in the early cases. One invoked the
corporate doctrine of ultra txres, holding that the participating corporations 'had
acted beyond their charter powers. The other involved application of common
law doctrines against restraints of trade and monopolies. See Thorelli, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 53.
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refiners. By accepting it, the defendant was bound to observe the
state policy underlying the grant, which was to promote trade in
sugar. The court said:
[T]he promotion of trade necessarily denotes the encourage-
ment of rivalry in the business-competition on equal terms
is conceded to be the life of trade, and to invite and promote
that competition is the established policy of our laws.
Whatever the rules prevailing in other junsdictions upon this
subject, in ours such a business-the maintenance of such a
monopoly-is distinctly an unlawful business. 14
By the time Congress passed the Sherman Act some twenty-one
states already had either constitutional or statutory prohibitions
against monopolies and restraints of trade.'" Others, like Cali-
fornia, had judicially adopted common law doctrine to the same
effect.
It was no accident that Congress did not insert in the Sherman
Act language that would preempt the antitrust field for exclusive
federal occupancy The Congressional debates make it clear that
the Act was intended only to supplement, and not to displace,
state regulation. 16
Considenng that the Sherman Act embodies the undefined
common law terms of "monopoly" and "restraint of trade," and
recalling that there was no common law within the federal junsdic-
tion, it has been aptly said that the Sherman Act is simply a
jurisdictional statute. It merely authorizes federal application of
common law antitrust concepts within the constitutional area of
federal concern.
The Supreme Court has long since rulled that in the Sherman
.4 State ex rel. Attorney General v. American Sugar Refinery Co., reprinted
m 7 By. & Corp. L.J. 83-86 (1890). Cf. 8 By. & Corp. L.J. 128 (1890).
15 See Seager & Gulick, Trust and Corporations Problems 841-42 (1929);
N. Y. State Bar Ass n, Report of the Special Committee to Study the New York
Antitrust Laws 6a (1957).
16 Senator Sherman stated: '"is bill has for its object to invoke
the aid of the courts of the United States to deal with the combination when
they affect injuriously our foreign and interstate commerce and in this way
to supplement the enforcement of the established rules of the common and
statute law by the courts of the several states in dealing with combinations that
affect injurlously the industrial liberty of the citizens of those states. It is to arm
the federal courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they may
cooperate with the state courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the most
dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the
eople of the United States. " (Emphasis added.) 21 Cong. Ree. 2457(1890).
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Act, Congress exhausted its powers under the Commerce Clause. 7
It is now accepted as doctrine that it covers not only transactions
in commerce, but also transactions, local in nature, which are
shown to affect an antecedent commerce.' Today, even this
distinction has begun to blur. Business practices evolve, and with
them so does the law The distribution cycle of modem business
is now such that retail sales have been held to be "in commerce"
in at least two cases.' 9
In these circumstances, it is well to ask whether a state can
now enforce its antitrust laws against conduct that would also
violate the Sherman Act?
The position that it may not rests on the argument that Con-
gress has preempted the field by leaving in force dunng the period
of expansion of the commerce power an act that has expanded
along with that power.20 The argument seems thin. It assumes
that congressional silence implies an intent to preempt, whereas
such silence is equally compatible with congressional satisfaction
with the concurrent junsdiction which has developed.
I come now to the court decisions dealing with antitrust
preemption. In every case we have found, the right of a state to
apply its antitrust laws to interstate commerce entering the state
has been upheld.
As far back as 1910 the Supreme Court upheld the application
of the Tennessee antitrust statute to restraints upon the sale of a
commodity shipped in from other states.2' Nowadays we are
prone to forget the long struggle to eliminate what Theodore
Roosevelt called "the twilight zone." This was the dimly outlined
and the narrow view then held of the federal jurisdiction under
17 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
Is E. United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau, 43 F Supp. 966, 971 (S.D.
Cal. 1942, afd 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1944).
19 Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Assn v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied 848 U.S. 817 (1954); Northern California Pharmaceutical
Assn v. United States, 1962 CCH Trade Cas. 1170379 (9th Cir. 1962).2 0 Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 Colum. L.
Rev. 1469, 1475 (1961).
21Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910), affirming State ex
rel. Cates v. Standard Oil Co., 110 S.W 565 (Tenn. 1908). The Tennessee act
covered "the importation or sale of articles imported into this State" as well as
wholly domestic commerce. It had been held valid by the Tennessee Supreme
Court against the claim it isolated the commerce clause 705, on the interpretation
that it applied only to articles already imported and which were no longer in
interstate commerce.
area between state limitations with respect to interstate commerce
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the commerce clause. Within this twlight zone antitrust violations
occurred with impunity To those of you who are interested in the
origin of today's concurrent jurisdiction, I recommend a reading
of the opinion of the state court in Standard Oil Co. v Tennessee
before the case went up on appeal. It said:
A combination affecting interstate commerce is none the less
a violation of the federal anti-trust statute, and punishable
under it, where the agreement made incidentally affects intra-
state commerce; and the same rule will apply to combinations
made in violation of the statute of the state upon the same
subject, where interstate commerce is incidentally affected.
If it were otherwise, neither the fedral nor the state laws
could be enforced in any case.22 (Emphasis added.)
Before the Supreme Court it was again claimed that the statute
violated the commerce clause. Denying the contention, Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
The mere fact that [the state act] may happen to remove
an interference with commerce among the States as well as
with the rest does not invalidate it How far Congress
could deal with such cases we need not consider, but cer-
tainly there is nothing in the present state of the law at
least that excludes the States from a familiar exercise of their
power.23
More recent cases in the federal circuit courts have not involved
state prosecutions for violation of their antitrust laws. Instead,
they have spoken of preemption only in connection with antitrust
defenses raised in suits for breach of contract.24 A sophisticated
point of view raises .doubts as to the weight to be given judicial
22 State ex rel. Cates v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 21, at 581. See also the
companion case, Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W 705 (1907).
23 Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413. 422. Holmes cited in support,
Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S. 618, 623 (1904), wherein it was said, in
this day of multiplied means of intercourse between the states there is scarcely
any control which cannot m a limited or remote degree be said to affect interstate
commerce. But it is only direct interferences with the freedom of such com-
merce that bnng the case within the exclusive domain of Federal legislation."24 "The states are not preempted of the nght to legislate with
reference to contracts in restraint of trade." Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-
Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 82 (6th Cir. 1948); the Illinois act "is applicable only to
intrastate commerce." Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1958).
remarks about preemption made in such a context. Concerning
antitrust defenses the Supreme Court has said:
[Vol. 51,
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Past the point where the judgment of the Court would itself
be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful by the
[Antitrust] Act, the courts are to be guided by the over-
riding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, 'of
preventing people from getting other people's property for
nothing when they purport to be buying it.'25
State courts presented with the question of preemption have
emphatically answered it in the negatve.2  In 1950 it was pointed
out by the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v McHugh:
[State antitrust] enactments are outgrowths of long estab-
lished common law doctrines and were designed to extend
and adapt those Idoctnncs to the needs of the time and
locality as seen by the local law making bodies. These needs
still exist, notwithstanding the Sherman Act. If State laws
have no force as soon as interstate commerce begins to be
affected, a very large area will be fenced off in which the
States will be practically helpless to protect their citizens
without any corresponding contribution to the national
welfare. (Emphasis added.)
27
State courts have repeatedly held that interstate activities are
subject to antitrust regulations by the states. Appellate courts in
Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin have granted injunctive relief
against monopolistic contracts and conspiracy in restraint of trade
in the drug,2 8 banking,29 and chemical " ° industries, respectively
A New York court declined to act concerning nationally dis-
tributed motion pictures only because no violation of the state
25 Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959).
20 These cases are collected in, Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1469, at 1485-86
(1961).
27 326 Mass. 249, 265, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (1950).
28 Oliver v. All-States Freight, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957),
aff'd, 167 Ohio St. 299 147 N E.2d 856 (1958), rev d on other grounds sub nom.
Local 24, Intl Bhd. o Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). A labor con-
tract allegedly creating a monopoly in the leasing of trucking equipment was held
to violate the state antitrust law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§1331.01-.14 (1960),
although the scheme operated in interstate commerce. The court stated: "We
find no federal statute ordenng, nor in fact any federal case which holds that the
federal government retains exclusively to itself the nght to remedy the evils
resulting from contracts and agreements between interstate earners and unions
found to be in restraint of trade. Federal legislation does not occupy the entire
field, to the exclusion of state laws." Oliver v. All-State Freight. Inc., supra at 196.
29 Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777
(1960) (Federal antitrust and banking laws do not preclude action under state
antitrust statute against nationd bank for attempt to monopolize banking within
a Michigan city.)
80 State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133
1960). See also Ritholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 4 N.W.2d 173 (1942)
Federal Trade Commission Act does not preempt the states.)
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statute was shown.81 Private litigants have recovered antitrust
damages against bankers in Michigan3 2 and insurance underwriters
in Califorma. 3  Sanctions have been imposed by Massachusetts
and California courts upon parties to union-management con-
spiracies that restrained competition in the fishing,34 and food35
industries.
The leading California case is Speegle v Board of Fire Under-
writers,86 decided in 1946. It presented squarely the question of
whether the Sherman Act precluded application of state antitrust
law to conduct having interstate aspects. Our Supreme Court
recognized that the applicable test was that set forth in the
South-Eastern Underwriters case.31 Simply stated, the test is
whether concurrent demands of state and national interests conflict
with each other in their application and enforcement, or whether
they can be accommodated, each with the other. In the Speegle
case the court concluded that:
Since there is no conflict between the law of this state and
the Sherman Act, plaintiff may invoke the state law even if
interstate commerce is involved.38
Our most recent appellate decision on this subject is Alfred M.
Lewis, Inc. v Warehousemen, Teamsters, Chauffers, and Helpers
Local Union No. 542.3' This is an interesting case because it in-
volved consideration of federal labor law as well as antitrust in its
relationship with the California statute. After a careful considera-
tion of the numerous factors involved in the doctrine of federal
preemption, again the court firmly concluded that there was none.
31 Leader Theatre Corp. v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280, 58
N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd 372 App. Div. 844, 76 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1948).
3
2 Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777
(1960). (This was a consolidation of state and private action.)3 3 Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 51, 172 P.2d 867,
877 (1946).
34 Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1959).
35 Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Warehousemen, Teamsters, Chauffeurs and
Helpers Local Union No. 542, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53, 64 (1958).
36 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946).
37 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
38 Speegle v. Board of Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 51, 172 P.2d 867, 877
(1946).
39163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53 (1958). The court said: "As there is
no conflict between the state and federal policies encompassed by the legislation
under consideration; no conflict between the state and federal acts; no need for
a single statute to effect uniformity of policy or procedure; the local law is within
the tradition of 'the usual police powersI of the state; and Congress has not
indicated its intent to preempt the field, it is our opinion that the Cartwnght Act
may be applied to the situation at bar in the state courts." Id. at 790.
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Last year the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the
question of preemption and arnved at a similar conclusion.40
Directly in point is a decision of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals decided in June of this year. In Texas v National Elec.
Contractors' Ass'n,41 it was held that there was no federal
preemption and that Texas could proceed under its own statute,
without reference to a pending federal action, even though the
same parties and the same subject matter were involved. The
Federal Antitrust Division filed an amicus bnef, denying preemp-
tion and asserting that state antitrust law is complementary rather
than repugnant to the federal regulatory scheme.
In conclusion, I wish to suggest a word of caution in evaluating
the language of these cases. To preserve the state junsdiction over
antitrust offenses committed within its boundaries, we still find
prevalent in state court opinions a definition of intrastate com-
merce that is outmoded when the extent of federal junsdiction
under the commerce clause is under consideration by the federal
courts. In United States v South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, the
Supreme Court said that 'legal formulae devised to uphold state
power cannot uncritically be accepted as trustworthy guides to
determine Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. '42
This does not mean, however, that they have lost their utility
in establishing the limits of state power within constitutional
bounds. We have here an almost classic example of how the
terminology of the law vanes according to context. An under-
standing of this point is essential to any evaluation of the question
of preemption. The critical eye looks for points of possible conflict
in the administration of state and federal laws. The cases empha-
size that state laws must neither discriminate against nor impose
undue burdens upon interstate commerce. Granted this, there is
no federal hindrance to the right of the states to protect their
residents from trade restraints pursuant to their police powers,
regardless of whether or not such restraints may also fall within
the federal jurisdiction. All that remains is need for sensible
coordination of state and federal forces and this, as I have- said,
is a practical and not a legal problem.
40 State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133
(1960).
41 Docket No. 13960, Tex. Cir. Ct. of App., June 12, 1962.
42322 U.S. 533, 545 (1944).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 51 Sprng, 1963 Number 3
EDITORIAL BOARD
1962-1968
ROBERT LAwSON
Editor-in-Chief
FRANK N. KiNG, JR.
Note Editor
HOWARD DOWNING
LOWELL T. HUGHES
PHmip B. AUsTm
JEFFERSON V LAYsoN, JR.
JOE C. SAVAGE
TERBENCE R. FrrzcERAA
WLTAM H. FORTUNE
WAYNE T. BumcH
WILLIm L. MONTAGUE
CH RLES SAMUEL WIEHAD
H. HAMILTON RICE, JR.
PAUL D. GUDGEL
MARSHAL P ELDRE, JR.
Associate Editor
WIL AM P SNYDER
Comment Editor
Roy E. Ponm
WiLLIAM B. MARnq
HAROLD D. ROGERS
THOMAS CHANDLER
DONALD Mum
GEORGE Mnis
LARRY GARMON
WILLIAM KoHmL PP
JOE HARION
JOE BuEcH
PAUL HnmoN-smus
JOHN BAIT
Faculty Editor
FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW
ex officto
MRS. MARTHA HUFF, Secretary
The Kentucky Law Journal is published in Fall, Winter, Spring' -nd Summer
by the College of Law, Umversity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. It is entered
as second-class matter October 12, 1927, at the post otice, at Lexington, Kentucky,
under the act of March S, 1879.
Commumcations of either an editonal or a business nature should be- ad-
dressed to Kentucky Law Journal, Umversity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
The purpose of the Kentucky Law Journal is to publish contribtitions of inter-
est and value to the legal profession, but the views expressed in such contributions
do not necessarily represent those of the Journal.
The Journal is a charter member of the Sbuthem Law Review Conference
and the National Conference of Law Reviews.
Subscnption price: $5.00 per year $2.00 per number
